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Welfare state and representation: Do women make the
welfare state or does the welfare state make women
representatives?
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Abstract
The relationship between welfare states and women’s representation in parliaments has
been of great interest to scholars. However, different strands of the literature on gender
and political representation suggest opposing directions of causality. On the one hand it
is argued that a rise in welfare spending increases women’s representation in parliaments,
but on the other hand, more women in parliaments is said to expand welfare spending.
This paper analyses the problem empirically and finds that the lagged values of women’s
parliamentary representation are better predictors of welfare spending than the lagged
values of spending are of women’s percent in parliaments. In other words, women make
the welfare state and welfare spending does not make female representatives.
Keywords: welfare spending, causality, parliamentary representation, legislative be-
haviour, gender
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1 Introduction
Research on women’s political representation is interested in both the causes of high or
low numeric representation of women in parliaments and the consequences to policy out-
comes of that representation. Thus, on the one hand researchers try to explain what
affects the percent of women elected to parliament. What are the barriers to equal repre-
sentation, what effect do electoral system, party recruitment processes, resources and/or
welfare regimes have on women’s electoral success? But on the other hand researchers
are also interested in whether female legislators make a difference for women – whether
female representatives vote differently from their male counterparts and support or initi-
ate legislation beneficial to women. In other words, once elected, do women also act for
women.
Both literatures are interested in how women’s representation relates to welfare states.
Scholars who try to explain women’s numeric representation in parliaments claim that
welfare state spending and/or ideology can improve women’s socioeconomic status, and
thereby increase their representation in elected office. However, work on legislative be-
haviour has found that female representatives are more supportive of welfare expansion
than men. Thus, an increase in female representatives can increases welfare spending.
The two literatures propose opposite causal paths – does the welfare state make women
representatives or do women make the welfare state?
In the following pages I will review the literature on the relationship between welfare
states and women’s representation in parliaments, outlining the causal arguments and
empirical evidence of both sides. The paper will then analyse the issue of causation
empirically using the Granger causality test and structural equation modelling. The
evidence presented here supports the argument that the percent of female legislators has
an effect on certain types of welfare spending, but not the other way around. For this
reason including welfare spending in models predicting women’s seat shares in legislatures
is highly endogenous.
It should be noted that this work is limited to democracies and makes no claims about
how women’s representation in parliaments and welfare state spending are related in non-
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democratic countries. The theories connecting welfare state and women’s representation
assume that the representatives are responsive to voters demands and individuals can
choose to run for office in free and fair elections. If this is not the case, as in many
non-democratic countries, the theoretical expectations will not hold.
2 Welfare state and representation
Researchers interested in explaining the percent of women in parliaments (descriptive
representation) have argued that women’s economic power and parity with men are pre-
cursors for female political representation (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Kunovich and
Paxton 2005; Oakes and Almquist 1993; Stockemer and Byrne 2011). Modernization
and female participation in the labour force spur on social change – as cultural norms
become more egalitarian, women become more active participants in the public sphere
(Matland 1998; Moore and Shackman 1996). The process of social change will affect both
how voters evaluate female politicians and how women themselves see their role in the
society, increasing both the demand for and the supply of female candidates for political
office (Stockemer and Byrne 2011). In addition, as development often increases female
employment it leads to improved skills and financial resources. Money and skills are nec-
essary to launch a successful campaign and voters evaluate candidates’ ability based on
previous professional achievements. As the presence of women among the pool of eligibles
increases, so should the number of female legislators (Darcy et al. 1994; Kenworthy and
Malami 1999; Oakes and Almquist 1993).
The empirical findings on the relationship between female employment and represen-
tation are inconclusive and scholars have pursued more nuanced theories to make sense of
the conflicting evidence. For example, some have argued that in the less developed coun-
tries women are overwhelmingly employed at subsistence level low-skill jobs and labour
force participation cannot have the same kind of effect on neither the resources nor the
social role and position of females in those nations (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Mat-
land 1998). Thus, employment should be related to political representation only in the
developed nations, where women take up more professional employment.
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Others have however suggested that welfare states interfere with the socioeconomic
predictors, such as employment, and can affect women’s representation. It has been shown
that government spending (Rosenbluth et al. 2006; Rule 1987; Thames and Williams
2010), welfare regime type (Siaroff 2000) or indicators of both (McDonagh 2010) can have
an effect on the percent of women in parliaments. The causal mechanisms proposed by
the different authors are quite varied. Broad statements have been made about the em-
powering effect of welfare states. Accordingly, this is why we find more female legislators
in Scandinavia (Paxton 1997) and why social democratic welfare regimes are associated
with more female MPs (Krook 2010; Siaroff 2000).
Some provide more nuanced theories. Rosenbluth et al (2006) argue that certain types
of welfare states may pressure parties into recruiting female candidates. Welfare states in
Scandinavia are employing women to fill care roles (e.g. childcare) that were previously
provided by women’s unpaid labour. This has produced a gender gap in public sector
employment, which in turn has also created an ideological gender gap. Women are more
leftist and more likely to support the welfare state than men. The authors argue that in
this context the parties find it beneficial to run and support female candidates as they
might be seen as a safeguard of the welfare state. By contrast, in welfare regimes where
women’s welfare benefits are related to that of their husband’s, or where women are not
employed so extensively by the public sector, this gender gap in ideology does not exist
and parties do not have to cater for special demands.
Finally, welfare states can also change the way voters view female candidates. By
adopting welfare policies the state lets voters know that maternal or caring attributes are
located in the public domain, leading voters to view women as suitable political leaders
(McDonagh 2010). Rule (1987) suggests that when welfare issues are more prominent,
women become more eligible for office as they are seen to have more expertise with
problems of child welfare and education. Voters and recruiters are more receptive to
female candidates in social welfare context. In both cases welfare policies are a way for
the state to cultivate favourable voter attitudes towards female politicians.
The above description of the relationship between welfare states and representation
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conflicts with research interested in the effect female legislators have on policy output.
Multiple studies have shown that gender affects representatives’ attitudes and their legisla-
tive behaviour (initiation and/or sponsorship of bills) on a diverse range of issues (Celis
2006; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Swers 1998; Thomas
1994; Vega and Firestone 1995). Female representatives can and do represent women’s
interests (e.g. provide substantive representation).
With respect to welfare states specifically, Wa¨ngnerud (2000) shows that female MPs
in Sweden are more likely to consider social welfare both as an area of professional interest
and a campaign issue. These results hold after taking account of other personal charac-
teristics (age, education) and party ideology. In both Finland and in Estonia women
are more likely than men to sponsor a bill on a social issue (Solvak 2011) and in the
United States female state legislators have more liberal attitudes towards welfare state
policies (Poggione 2004). Poggione 2004 also finds that the effect of gender on legislators’
attitudes remains significant and substantial even after controlling for party, ideology,
characteristics of the district and the representative (e.g. race and religion).
Support for the effect of gender on MPs’ attitudes and behaviour towards social policy
issues is mostly based on single country analysis, with some research also providing com-
parative evidence from a small number of countries (Narud and Valen 2000; Schwindt-
Bayer 2006; Wa¨ngnerud 2000b). Large-N comparative research is rare, but point to
similar findings. For example, Bolzendahl and Brooks (2007) study 12 advanced democ-
racies, concluding that female legislative seat shares affect welfare spending, controlling
for government ideology. Kittilson’s (2011) study of 24 democracies shows that shares of
female party delegates and party executives contribute to the focus on social justice and
(in some cases) welfare state expansion in party programs. Again, these results hold after
controlling for party ideology.
The reason for women’s support of the welfare state might be their different life expe-
riences from men and women’s structural position in the society. The gendered division
of labour and traditionally female caregiving roles can have an impact on attitudes about
equality. For this reason women are more likely to support policies that increase equality,
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may it be affirmative action or greater social justice (Kittilson 2011). In addition women’s
experiences also lead them to raise new policy issues that are important to women. These
may include policies to combat violence against women (Goetz 1998), or improve women’s
access to the labour market and provide ways to balance family and working life (Celis
2006). Both lines of arguments suggest that women have a greater interest in supporting
the welfare state, to enhance equality and respond to issues relating to family life.
Note that most of these different theories centre on the childcare and work-
life balance aspects of the welfare state. Women either directly or indirectly
benefit from childcare and thus become more successful in their bid for of-
fice, or women as representatives support the expansion of state funded care
because they have a greater interest in this compared to men.
Disentangling the direction of causality between welfare spending and women’s parlia-
mentary representation is very difficult. The first mover in this puzzle may have been the
welfare state, rather than female legislators, as welfare state development dates further
back than women’s gains in parliamentary representation. However, even at the phase of
welfare state development, women’s mobilization (though not parliamentary representa-
tion) has probably had an influence on the development of the welfare state (Huber and
Stephens 2001, pp. 125-126). Regardless of the initial developments, today the reciprocal
relationship cannot be dismissed.
3 Welfare spending and representation: the empiri-
cal relationship
3.1 Data and variables
I analyse the empirical relationship between women’s representation and welfare state
using the Granger Causality test and structural equation modelling. The data covers 33
OECD countries, of which the older democracies are observed over three decades (from
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1980 to 2010), and the newer ones only the last decade due to the lack of data.1 All data
on social expenditure is from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)
1980-2011-2014 (OECD 2015). I have used the in kind family spending as a
percent of GDP to measure welfare state regime type. The in kind family
benefits cover public spending on services such as day care and home-help
services while the cash benefits cover family, maternity, paternity allowances,
income support during leave, sole parent payments and other child allowances
and credits. SOCX data has been adjusted the indicators for cross-national
differences in the compulsory age of entry into primary school (Adema and
Ladaique 2009).
Previous research has also used government spending or total social spend-
ing as a percent of GDP to measure welfare state regimes. But as some authors
admit, these measures are not without problems and have been used due to
the lack of a better alternative at the time (Rosenbluth et al. 2006). A pre-
ferred measure in this context is social service (in kind) spending (Bolzendahl
and Brooks 2007), which most closely reflects the causal mechanisms.
Table 1 shows the averages for the different types social and family spend-
ing by welfare regime type. Total and cash social spending and cash family
spending are similar in both conservative and social democratic regimes, but
both types of in kind spending are higher in social democratic regime com-
pared to the conservative and other regimes. Table 1 supports the idea that
the crucial difference between welfare regimes is not about how much is spent,
but in how the spending is done (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens
2000).
[TABLE 1 HERE]
The table also shows the average percent of seats held by women in the
lower or the single house of the parliament. The percent of women in parlia-
ments is nearly twice as large in the social democratic regimes compared to
1A list of countries and some descriptive data is provided in the appendix. Data will be available from
the author upon request.
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all the other welfare regime types. The liberal regimes have, on average, the
fewest representatives with the other and conservative regimes just slightly
ahead. The percent of female representatives correlates strongly with in kind
family and social spending (coefficients 0.69 and 0.67 respectively), for total
family and social spending the association is weaker (0.62 and 0.55 respec-
tively). The below models use in kind family spending because it both suits
best theoretically and has the strongest empirical relationship with female
representation. All variables are measured at election years.
The focus of this paper is comparing two sets of causally opposing hypothe-
ses on welfare spending and women’s representation in parliaments:
1. Increase in the percent of female representatives increases in kind family
spending.
2. Increase in the in kind family spending increases the percent of female
representatives.
Section 2 showed that researchers have argued and provided empirical sup-
port for both of these, but have not raised the issue of endogeneity and com-
pared the competing hypothesis empirically at the same time using panel data.
The purpose of this paper is to do exactly that.
3.2 Granger causality
The Granger causality test rests on the idea that if an event A happens before event
B, it is possible for A to have caused B, but it is impossible for B to have caused A
because time does not run backward. This idea can be used to test for the possibility of
causation between two time series. The Granger causality test basically consists of two
sets of regressions. The first of these regresses B on the lagged values of B and then
compares it to a model where the lagged values of A are also added. If the lagged values
of A improve model fit and have a significant effect on B we can say that event A is useful
in predicting event B, or A Granger caused B. The second set of models regresses A on
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the lagged values of A and then adds the lagged values of B in the next model. Again,
if the lagged values of B improve model fit and have a significant effect on A then B
Granger causes A.
Table 2 shows the regression models and the results of the F -tests. The Chi-Square
statistic from the Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation in panel models
is also shown. The test shows no AR(1) correlation in the residuals. The first
set of models test whether the lagged value of female members of parliaments (female
MPt−1) can predict in kind family spending. We can see that lagged value of family
spending can explain 92.3% of the variation in its current value. Adding the lagged value
of women’s representation increases the R2 to 92.7% and the F -test shows the increase is
significant. The coefficient for lagged value of female MPs is also statistically significant.
This means that the lagged value of women’s representation improves model fit and should
be included as an explanatory variable – women’s representation Granger causes in kind
family spending.
The second set of regressions shows the effect of lagged family spending on represen-
tation. This time we see that adding lagged in kind family spending to the restricted
model does not have a statistically significant effect on the overall explanatory power –
R2 is not increased and the F -test is not significant. The coefficient for lag of family
spending itself is also not significant. Welfare spending does not Granger cause women’s
political representation. In sum, the Granger causality test suggest that it is possible that
the female representatives make the welfare state, but in kind family spending does not
increase women’s representation.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
I also tested whether including the ideological composition of the parliament affected
above findings. It is possible that both high women’s representation in the parliament
and high in kind family spending are both results of a large number of representatives
belonging to left-wing parties. I added lagged values of the percentage of left parties’
legislative seats to both sets of models. The data is from Swank (2013) and cover 21 of
the 33 OECD countries, excluding all new democracies, Iceland, Luxembourg and Israel.
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The dataset includes a variety of variables on the ideological composition of the parliament
and government, including the percent of left party cabinet portfolios, percent of left party
legislative seats and percent of left party legislative votes. Of the different variables the
percent of left party legislative seats correlated the strongest with in kind family spending
and female representation.
The inclusion of left party seats in the model predicting in kind family spending
improved model fit only slightly and the variable itself fell below significance. Most
importantly, the inclusion of left party seats did not change the size and significance of
the effect female representation has on in kind spending. In the models explaining female
representation the addition of the new variable had no real effect on the model fit, nor on
the coefficients of the other variables. The results are presented in the Appendix Table 5.
3.3 Structural equation modelling
The second empirical test explored here, structural equation modelling, allows the estima-
tion of endogenous systems – i.e. equations where one variable could at the same time be
an independent and a dependent variable. Because structural equation modelling (SEM)
is often called causal modelling some take it as a test of causality. I emphasize that SEM,
like the Granger causality test, cannot in and of itself determine causality, and is a test of
association. But just as with the Granger test, we can determine with statistical analysis
how strong is the evidence for or against any of the causal structures.
With the models presented here I test the strength of three different causal paths.
As before, I hypothesize that women’s representation affects welfare spending, and that
welfare state spending influences women’s political representation. In addition, I also al-
low for a third causal path by which welfare states affect female employment and female
employment in turn impacts women’s representation. I have added this to see whether
welfare states have an indirect effect on representation. Also, legislators cannot directly
increase female employment so the risk of endogeneity would be lower in this case. Female
labour force participation is measured as women’s employment as a percent of men’s. The
correlation between female employment and representation in parliament is about 0.64.
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The relationship between employment and in-kind family spending is just as strong (corre-
lation coefficient 0.64), but with total social and family spending it is weaker (coefficients
0.41 and 0.56 respectively).
I analyse the significance of the three causal paths by first estimating a model that
includes all three, and then estimate models where each of the three paths are removed
one at a time. The model fit of each of the reduced models is then compared to the
full model that includes all paths. A causal path is important when removing it reduces
model fit significantly compared to the full model.
The structures of the models estimated are shown in Figure 1. The highlighted boxes
mark the endogenous variables in the model and the black single-headed arrows reflect
the hypothesized direction of causality. For example, in all models the lag of women’s
representation (percent of women elected into office at the previous election, Wt−1) is
allowed to predict the current level of female MPs (Wt). In the same manner the in-kind
family spending at the time of previous election (St−1) is allowed to influence in-kind
family spending at the current election year (St) and also female employment at the time
of the current election (Et).
The highlighted arrows reflect the causal directions that are of interest here. In the
Full model we are assuming that all three causal paths exist: (1) women’s representation
affects in-kind family spending, (2) welfare states have an independent direct effect on
representation, and, (3) welfare states influence representation through employment. The
models A, B and C are nested in the full model – they have the same variables, but
fewer paths. In model A I have omitted the direct effect of family spending on women’s
representation (St−1 → Wt omitted). Model B omits the effect of employment on women’s
representation (Et → Wt). Lastly, model C omits the effect of women’s representation on
family spending (Wt−1 → St).
The grey double-headed arrows reflect covariation.2 The model does not specify what
caused women’s representation or in kind family spending at the previous election, but we
2Because the estimation of structural equation models is based on the variance-covariance matrix of all
variables included in the model, the covariation between all pairs of variables either have to be included
in the model, otherwise they are assumed to be zero.
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know that the two variables correlate. Also, women’s employment should be correlated
with representation at the previous election. Without specifying these paths we assume
there to be no correlation between these variables. Omitting relevant correlations will
affect model fit.
The model used here is very simple, which affect the sizes of the coefficients. The
purpose of this article is not necessarily to determine the size of the effect explanatory
variables have on the dependent variable, but to see whether removing any of the effects
is justified.3
3.4 Results from SEM
The results of the models for all OECD countries are presented in Table 3. The model
names reflect the path diagrams shown in Figure 1. The path coefficients are estimated
using GLS and can be read like any other regression coefficients. Structural equation
modeling has a strong focus on model fit; the goal is to construct the most fitting struc-
ture between the variables entered into the model. Unlike in regular regression analysis,
models with poor fit are rejected in SEM, regardless whether some individual effects are
statistically significant or not. The model fit is assessed by looking at the chi square, root
mean square error approximation (RMSEA) and goodness of fit index (GFI). The null
hypothesis of the chi square test is that the original and the estimated covariance matrix
are the same. Thus if the model fits, we would not reject the null hypothesis, and if the
fit is poor, we would reject it (the two matrices are different). Nested models can be
compared by looking at the change in chi square. If the chi square change is marginal, a
simpler model should be preferred. RMSEA penalizes for any added parameters (path co-
efficients and covariances). A RMSEA below 0.05 shows a good model fit. The goodness
of fit index should be above 95% for good model fit.4
3Cees (Eijk et al. 2007) used SEM in a similar manner when studying the reciprocal effects of subjective
economic evaluations and government support.
4The RMSEA is recommended for samples larger than 200, in smaller samples the index can be high
and we risk rejecting the model too often. The opposite is true for the chi square test, which rejects the
model too often when sample size is above 200. As the sample here is just around 200, both indices are
shown. See (Schumacker and Lomax 2004, p. 100) and (Bowen and Guo 2012, pp. 141-146) for more
details.
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The Full model shows a reasonable fit, but we can also notice that models A and
B are not worse. While the chi square is larger for models A and B, as is usual when
paths are removed, the increase in chi square from the full model is marginal and not
statistically significant. Thus, removing either the indirect or the direct effect of welfare
states on women’s political representation does not reduce the explanatory power of the
model. Substantively, these data and models again suggest that in kind family spending
does not affect women’s representation.
Of all models presented, model C fares poorly according to all criteria and should be
rejected. Substantively this means that we cannot remove the effect of women’s represen-
tation on family spending from the equation. As suggested by scholars interested in the
effects of gender on legislative behaviour, women’s representation has a positive effect on
in-kind family spending. The model coefficients show that a 10% increase in the share of
female MPs increases in kind family spending by 0.04% of GDP. This seems like a small
number, but even Sweden, the country with highest in-kind family spending, allocates
just over 2% of GDP to these benefits. The lowest average in kind family spending (in
Canada and Ireland) is 0.11% of GDP, and a 0.04% point increase would mark a sizeable
growth in spending in those countries. The size of the effect is the same in the Granger
causality test. However, since the models are likely to omit other relevant explanations
we should be very cautious about taking this effect at its face value.
Table 3 also shows that female employment does not have a significant effect on
women’s representation. The effect of female employment on representation may be con-
tingent on the types of employment taken up by women and the effect might be weaker
or even absent in newer democracies. To analyse this, I also ran the same four models
on the 24 older OECD members. The results are shown in Appendix Table 6. While
the size of the coefficient on employment is more than double compared to the results
in Table 3, the effect still falls below conventional significance levels. Other results were
nearly identical. The full model shows again a reasonable fit. Model C has a very poor fit
and should be rejected, meaning that the effect of women’s parliamentary representation
on in kind family spending should not be removed from the model. Model A shows the
14
best fit; excluding the direct effect of family spending on representation has no significant
consequences to model fit.
The two tests performed here suggest that there is no evidence of the direct effect of
welfare states, specifically in kind family spending, on the percent of women in national
parliaments. Instead we find support for the reverse – women’s representation affects in
kind family spending. While these results do not conclusively determine the direction of
causality, they clearly highlight the problem of endogeneity in the literature concerned
with studying women’s numeric representation parliaments. The strong effect of welfare
spending on women’s representation that some authors find may owe much to the reverse
effect of female legislators on welfare spending. Using direct legislative outcomes (e.g.
welfare spending) to predict representation is highly problematic because these outcomes
are decided on by representatives themselves.
4 Conclusions
Scholars of women’s political representation have studied both the causes of high or low
numeric representation in parliaments and the consequences to policy outcomes of that
representation. These two strands of literature have been interested in how representation
is respectively influenced or influences welfare state spending. On the one hand it is argued
that welfare state ideology and/or spending can increase the representation of women in
parliaments. But on the other hand, higher welfare spending has been seen as a result of
women’s election to parliaments. While the arguments of both sides seem well reasoned
and empirically supported, they clearly point to opposing directions of causality. In this
paper I have explored the issue empirically using the Granger causality test and structural
equation modelling.
The empirical findings presented here strongly suggest that while women’s parliamen-
tary seat shares make for a good predictor of in kind family spending, spending does
not predict women’s percent in parliaments. In other words, women make the welfare
states rather than the welfare state making women representatives. For the research on
welfare states and women’s descriptive representation this should warrant some pause for
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thought. Welfare state spending, a direct outcome of legislative action, is endogenous to
representation and cannot be used as its predictor.
However, the point here was not to say that welfare states are unimportant for women,
or for their political representation. Welfare spending is associated with many macro level
outcomes, such as socioeconomic inequality and poverty, and even affect very private
decisions, such as if and when to have children, or whether to move to another country.
Indeed, the various effects of welfare states permeate through our lives in so many ways
that it is almost impossible to say that it does not affect representation. The real question
is how they matter, and to identify the particular aspects and outcomes that are the most
relevant for women’s representation. For example, welfare states with higher spending on
childcare services are associated with increased female employment levels, which in turn
can affect women’s political participation and representation. Thus, welfare states may
have an indirect impact on women’s legislative seat shares by shaping their socioeconomic
position.
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Table 1: Public spending and female representation by welfare regime
Type of Social Conservative Liberal Other
spending Democratic
Total social spending 24.2 22.7 16.1 16.0
In kind 10.3 7.3 7.0 5.2
Cash 13.0 14.8 8.8 10.5
Total family 3.3 2.1 1.5 1.2
In kind 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.4
Cash 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.8
Percent female MPs 32.5 17.8 12.7 13.9
Note: “Others” include new democracies of Eastern Europe, South
America and Korea.
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Table 2: Granger causality tests between women’s representation and in kind family
spending
DV: In-kind family spending DV: Percent female representatives
(First set of hypothesis) (Second set of hypothesis)
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value
Intercept 0.087 0.012 *** 0.045 0.015 *** 2.430 0.373 *** 2.444 0.372 ***
Family spendingt−1 0.981 0.019 *** 0.926 0.022 *** 0.407 0.400
Female MPt−1 0.004 0.001 *** 0.977 0.018 *** 0.963 0.020 ***
Breusch-Godfrey test 0.263 0.753 1.157 0.788
N 227 227 227 227
R2 0.923 0.927 *** 0.932 0.932
Note: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05. R2 is followed by the significance level of the F -test. The standard errors are based on
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation from the plm package (Croissant and Millo 2008).
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Table 3: Structural equation models of women’s representation in 33 OECD countries
Full model Model A Model B Model C
All causal St−1 → Wt Et → Wt Wt−1 → St
paths omitted omitted omitted
β SE β SE β SE β SE
DV: Family in kind benefits
Familyt−1 0.915 0.026 *** 0.915 0.026 *** 0.915 0.026 *** 0.972 0.021 ***
Female MPt−1 0.004 0.001 *** 0.004 0.001 *** 0.004 0.001 ***
DV: Percent of women in parliament
Female MPt−1 0.967 0.027 *** 0.970 0.024 *** 0.975 0.025 *** 0.968 0.028 ***
Familyt−1 0.113 0.532 0.261 0.497 0.111 0.554
Employment 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.022
DV: Employment ratio
Familyt−1 14.538 1.177 *** 14.541 1.177 *** 14.538 1.181 *** 14.538 1.206 ***
N 217 217 217 217
χ2 1.166 0.558 1.210 0.750 1.726 0.631 10.473 0.015 **
RMSEA 0.000 (0.000, 0.115) 0.000 (0.000, 0.079) 0.000 (0.000, 0.093) 0.107 (0.042, 0.182)
GFI 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.903
Note: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05. The table shows the estimated path coefficients, followed by standard errors.
The chi square statistic is followed by the p-values. For RMSEA the 90% confidence intervals are shown in parenthesis.
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Figure 1: Path models of women’s representation and family spending.
Wt – women in the parliament at current election (percent), Wt−1 – women at a previous election,
St – spending on in kind family benefits, St−1 – spending on in kind family benefits at a previous
election, Et – female employment.
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Appendix
Table 4: Welfare states, employment and representation in parliament, OECD nations
1980-2012
Country New Welfare In kind family Female Percent
democracy state type spending employment female MPs
Sweden social 2.1 93.6 36.1
Norway social 1.1 86.3 34.4
Finland social 1.3 91.8 34.2
Denmark social 2.0 88.3 32.4
Netherlands conservative 0.7 72.6 27.4
Iceland social 1.3 90.9 23.3
Mexico Yes other 0.6 51.2 22.4
New Zealand liberal 0.4 77.8 21.9
Austria conservative 0.4 74.5 21.9
Germany conservative 0.6 73.7 21.6
Belgium conservative 0.5 71.2 19.5
Spain other 0.3 58.3 19.1
Switzerland conservative 0.2 78.3 18.8
Estonia Yes other 0.3 86.8 17.5
Poland Yes other 0.3 82.0 17.2
Czech Republic Yes other 0.4 79.2 16.9
Canada liberal 0.1 81.9 16.3
Luxembourg conservative 0.4 64.0 15.7
Slovakia Yes other 0.3 80.4 15.6
Australia liberal 0.4 73.5 14.3
Portugal other 0.2 74.9 14.2
Italy conservative 0.4 59.8 12.4
Slovenia Yes other 0.6 87.7 11.8
United Kingdom liberal 0.7 78.7 11.6
Chile Yes other 0.3 50.5 11.0
USA liberal 0.4 80.7 10.4
Israel conservative 1.1 75.5 10.3
Ireland liberal 0.3 56.3 9.5
Hungary Yes other 1.2 79.0 9.3
France conservative 0.9 78.3 9.1
Greece other 0.3 60.6 7.5
Korea Yes other 0.2 68.7 7.3
Japan liberal 0.3 68.6 4.7
Note: Data for new democracies from 2000. Data is ordered by percent of female MPs.
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Table 5: Granger causality tests between women’s representation and in kind family spending, controlling for left seats
DV: In kind family spending DV: Percent female representatives
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value
Intercept 0.080 0.017 *** 0.041 0.022 0.011 0.030 2.368 0.401 *** 2.394 0.402 *** 1.917 0.549 ***
Family spendingt−1 0.979 0.020 *** 0.925 0.028 *** 0.922 0.028 *** 0.414 0.517 0.369 0.517
Female MPt−1 0.004 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 ** 0.983 0.018 *** 0.968 0.026 *** 0.962 0.026 ***
Left seatst−1 0.001 0.001 0.016 0.013
Breusch-Godfrey test
N 182 182 182 182 182 182
R2 0.931 0.934 *** 0.935 0.943 0.943 0.943
Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05. R2 is followed by the significance level of the F -test.
The data covers 21 OECD countries of the 33 (excluded are all new democracies, Iceland, Luxembourg and Israel).
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Table 6: Structural equation models of women’s representation in 24 OECD countries
Full model Model A Model B Model C
All causal St−1 → Wt Et → Wt Wt−1 → St
paths omitted omitted omitted
β SE β SE β SE β SE
DV: Family in kind benefits
Family spendingt−1 0.927 0.030 *** 0.928 0.030 *** 0.927 0.030 *** 0.980 0.024 ***
Female MPt−1 0.004 0.002 ** 0.004 0.002 ** 0.004 0.002 **
DV: Percent of women in parliament
Female MPt−1 0.938 0.031 *** 0.943 0.029 *** 0.956 0.029 *** 0.945 0.032 ***
Family spendingt−1 0.258 0.602 0.596 0.561 0.168 0.630
Employment 0.044 0.032 0.050 0.029 0.044 0.032
DV: Employment ratio
Family spendingt−1 13.130 1.125 *** 13.153 1.125 *** 13.130 1.140 *** 13.130 1.172 ***
N 162 162 162 162
χ2 3.268 0.195 3.451 0.327 5.130 0.163 9.246 0.026 **
RMSEA 0.062 (0.000, 0.181) 0.031 (0.000, 0.140) 0.066 (0.000, 0.162) 0.114 (0.035, 0.201)
GFI 0.992 0.991 0.987 0.977
Note: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05
The table shows the estimated path coefficients, followed by standard errors. The chi square statistic is followed
by the p-values. For RMSEA the 90% confidence intervals are shown in parenthesis
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